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Abstract: Takaful industry has witnessed an exponential growth across the world over the last 
decade, demonstrating an enormous demand for takaful products ranging from short-term 
general takaful to long-term family takaful. It has attracted considerable attention not only from 
the Muslim countries, but also from the non-Muslim countries. Despite its promising growth, 
however, the takaful industry continues to face numerous contentious Shari'ah issues. The 
present study aims to discuss some of the most fundamental Shari'ah issues in takaful, namely 
the issue of applying tabarru' concept in takaful and the issue of underwriting surplus of 
tabarru' fund.  
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Introduction 
 
The demarcation between conventional insurance and Islamic insurance (hereafter 
referred to as takaful) lies in the underlying concepts and contracts employed. While the former 
applies the concept of tabarru’ (donation) as the underlying concept, the former uses the 
contract of exchange thus the issue of riba, gharar (uncertainty) and maysir (gambling) emerge. 
The element of riba in conventional insurance exists in two ways. Firstly, money is 
exchanged for money whereby policyholders pay sum of money in the form of premium with 
the exchange of money in the form of claim in the future. The issue of riba takes place because 
the exchange is not made on spot and the amount received by policyholders is usually higher 
than the actual amount paid. Secondly, the premium paid by policyholders are invested in 
interest bearing instruments such as treasury bills and fixed deposits in conventional banks. 
Furthermore, the issue of gharar arises in conventional insurance practices due to the 
uncertainty of the subject matter. For example, both the policy and premium are uncertain as the 
actual value is very much dependent upon the occurrence of catastrophe which is uncertain 
(Adawiyah, 2010). In addition, the element of maysir in conventional insurance takes place as a 
consequence of the existence of gharar. Maysir is a form of gharar and zero sum game that is 
prohibited by Shari’ah, as the profit or loss is contingent to the occurrence or otherwise of 
claims. In other words, the profit of one party is determined by the loss of another party.  
With that, the concept of takaful is introduced so as to eliminate such intolerable 
elements. It is achieved by changing the underlying contract of insurance from an exchange 
contract to the concept of donation (tabarru'). Tabarru' means a voluntary contribution given by 
a person during his lifetime to another person, without expecting any compensation in return, 
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which results in the ownership transfer of the subject matter from the donor to the recipient 
(Parid, 2009). From Shari'ah perspective, tabarru' is charitable contract which is normally 
unilateral in nature as opposed to contract of exchange; and that in the unilateral contract the 
application of the rule of uncertainty is more flexible Thus, even though the element of gharar 
and maysir may persist in takaful operation, the concept of tabarru’ tolerates such uncertainty 
as the tabarru' contribution is not used for profit making activities rather for mutual assistance 
purposes only. If the participant were to face unforeseen events in the future, the group of 
people will then aim to create both mutual indemnity and mutual assistance for the participant. 
Meanwhile, the element of interest (riba) is also eliminated in the takaful operation as all of the 
funds are invested in Shari’ah compliant activities only. In this sense, the tabarru' concept 
removes the non-permissible elements in insurance (Adawiyah, 2010). 
However, although the concept of tabarru' has been widely accepted to serve as an 
alternative solution from the existing conventional system, many contentious Shari'ah issues 
still arise in the application of tabarru' for takaful. The present study therefore aims to examines 
the issues surrounding the use of tabarru' in takaful industry.  
Following the introduction, the next section discusses the overview of takaful concept, 
covering its definitions from the various international organizations such as Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (hereafter referred to as AAOIFI) and 
Islamic Financial Services Board (hereafter referred to as IFSB). The next part in this section 
explains in greater detail the various contracts and models of takaful, such as the mudharabah 
model, wakalah model and hybrid model. Section 3 delineates the key Shari’ah issues related to 
use of tabarru' concept in takaful, reflected in Participant Risk Fund (PRF). Section 4 provides 
the concluding thoughts on the subject matters discussed.  
 
Concept of Takaful 
 
Definition of Takaful 
 
The word "Takaful" is derived from a root word kafala which means guarantee or 
indemnity. Technically, takaful is a mutual insurance whereby a group of participants agree to 
contribute sum of donation to assist each other from a defined financial loss in the future arising 
from either catastrophe or misfortune. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institution (AAOIFI) standards (2004:05) defined takaful as "a system through which 
the participants donate part or all of their contributions which are used to pay claims for 
damages suffered by some of the participants. The company's role is restricted to managing the 
insurance operations and investing the insurance contributions". On the other hand, the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) defined it as "the Islamic counterpart of conventional 
insurance, and exists in both life (and family) and general forms, whereby it is based on the 
concept of mutual solidarity, and a typical takaful undertaking will consist of a two tier structure 
- hybrid of a mutual and a commercial form of company". In the same context, Islamic 
Financial Services Act 2013 defines takaful as"an arrangement based on mutual assistance 
under which takaful participants agree to contribute to a common fund providing for mutual 
financial benefits payable to the takaful participants or their beneficiaries on the occurence of a 
pre-agreed events."The concept of takaful in Islam is based on the notion of mutual assistance 
(ta'awun), mutual security and responsibility (tadhamun), and mutual protection and assurance,  
incorporated into the concept of tabarru' (donation).  
The principle of mutual assistance is deduced from the verse of the Holy Quran which 
reads: ‘Help one another in al-Birr and in al-Taqwa (virtue, righteousness and piety): but do 
not help one another in sin and transgression' (Al-Ma'idah 5: 2). It is also supported by a hadith 
that states: "Allah will always help His servant for as long as he helps others." (Narrated by 
Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and Imam Abu Daud). The principle of mutual security and 
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responsibility is evidenced by a hadith of the Prophet (pbuh) which reads: The place of 
relationships and feelings of people with faith, between each other, is just like the body; when 
one of its parts is afflicted with pain, then the rest of the body will be affected (Narrated by 
Imam al-Bukhari and Imam Muslim). Meanwhile, the spirit of mutual protection and assurance 
is substantially supported by a hadith narrated by Imam Ahmad bin Hambal which states: "By 
my life, which is in Allah’s power, nobody will enter Paradise if he does not protect his 
neighbor who is in distress."  
 
Contracts and Models of Takaful 
 
As indicated earlier, the primary feature of takaful that distinguishes it from conventional 
insurance is the application of tabarru’ concept. The concept of tabarru' is applied in takaful 
operations so as to indicate the relationships among the participants. Under this concept, each 
participant donates a sum of contribution amount to mutually assist and indemnify each other in 
the event of misfortune. The fund is placed into namely a participant risk fund (PRF) and treated 
as a "common ownership" and will be utilized when helping the participant who suffers from 
catastrophe. In current practice, however, the purpose is not skewed for merely mutual 
protection only but has also grown to include both investments and savings. This is particularly 
true in the case of family takaful product. Therefore, instead of a single fund, takaful operator 
divides the fund into two separate funds: Participant Risk Fund (PRF) and Participant 
Investment Fund (PIF).  The position of takaful company in this context is being the agent or 
investment manager of the participants. Thus, the underlying contracts that are mainly utilised 
to indicate the relationship between takaful operator and participants are mainly mudharabah 
contract and wakalah contract. Both are further explained below. 
 
Mudharabah Model 
Mudharabah is a partnership contract whereby one party provides a capital while another 
party offers skill and entrepreneurship. A profit, if any, will be shared based on the pre agreed 
ratio. Any financial loss will be borne solely by the capital provider (rabb maal) while the fund 
manager (mudharib) will bear the loss of effort and labor.  
Figure 1: Mudharabah Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In regard to takaful operation, the capital providers are known as the participants while 
the fund managers are the takaful operators. Under this contract, the takaful operator will accept 
the contributions from the participants. The contribution is deemed as a capital (ra'sul maal) 
that will be managed and invested in a Shari’ah compliant manner. The contract specifies that 
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based on the ratio agreed upfront. In the event of loss in the Participant‟s Risk Fund (PRF), 
however, takaful operator shall provide an interest free loan (qard) that should be repaid when 
the PRF generates profit (Dusuki (ed), 2011).  The underwriting surplus, if any, will be 
distributed to the participants since it is not part of the profit.  Figure 1 above depicts the process 
flow of mudharabah model.  
As depicted above, the pure mudharabah model allows takaful operator to only enjoy 
profit sharing based on agreed ratio, and not an underwriting surplus.  The underwriting surplus 
in this model should be fully distributed to the participants as it is part of the principle, and not 
the profit. However, this condition is not preferred by most takaful operator. Thus, the takaful 
operator constructs a modified mudharabah model whereby the underwriting surplus is 
construed as “mudharabah profit" to be shared between the participants and the takaful operator 
(Adawiyah and Odierno, 2008). Figure 2 below shows the operational flow of this modified 
mudharabah model. 
Figure 2: Modified Mudharabah Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wakalah Model 
In the case of wakalah, it is an agency contract whereby party mandates another party as 
his agent to perform a particular task. Adopting this in the takaful practice, the principal 
(muwakkil) is known as the participant while the agent (wakil) is regarded as the takaful 
operator. The participant appoints the takaful operator as an agent to manage the fund. As 
compensation, the takaful operator is entitled to attain a pre-determined agreed fee. Takaful 
operator then invests the fund in Shari’ah compliant investments. Any profit or surplus will be 
fully distributed to the participants. Figure 3 below illustrates the operational flow of this model. 
 
Figure 3: Wakalah Model 
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The absent of surplus sharing in the Wakalah model calls for the takaful operator to 
reconsider this above-mentioned model. With that, some of the takaful operators then proposed 
the application of a modified wakalah . In this model, the takaful operator are entitled to attain a 
pre agreed fee based on the principle of wakalah and concurrently a portion of surplus, called as 
performance fee. Figure 4 below shows the process flow of the modified wakalah model.  
 
Figure 4. Modified wakalah model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hybrid Model 
The hybrid model is basically formulated using the combination of mudharabah and 
wakalah or the combination of wakalah and waqf. Under the former combination, the 
mudharabah contract is applied to indicate the position of takaful operator as the manager of the 
participants‟ investment fund, while the wakalah contract is used to justify the position of 
takaful operator as an underwriter of the participants‟ risk fund. As a manager, the takaful 
operator will enjoy the portion of profit based on an agreed ratio for investing the fund, while as 
an underwriter the takaful operator are entitled to a pre-determined fee (Dusuki,(ed) 2011). 
Figure 5 below depicts the illustration of the hybrid model of mudharabah and wakalah in 
takaful. 
 
Figure 5: Hybrid of Wakalah and Mudharabah Model 
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In the case of the combination of wakalah and waqf model, it has been introduced by 
Sheikh Taqi Uthmani and it has successfully been developed in Pakistan (Dusuki,(ed) 2011). 
The general idea of this model is to enable any individual to assist each other in the event of 
catastrophe using the waqf fund. Using this model, the shareholders of takaful operator initially 
place donation in establishing the waqf fund. Simultaneously, participants also contribute sum 
of the donations to be put in the waqf fund. In this sense, the waqf fund consists of namely two 
sources; the shareholders‟ fund and the participants‟ fund. The pool of fund is then invested in 
Shari’ah compliant business activities. If any of the participants were to experience misfortune, 
the profit generated from the waqf fund will be used to assist each of the participants (Dusuki, 
(ed), 2011).   
Figure 6: Hybrid of Wakalah and Waqf Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Takaful operator in this model serves as an agent (wakil) of both the shareholders and 
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in a pure sense. Rather, the donation is created conditionally: each participant in takaful should 
donate a particular amount so as to cover an unexpected financial loss in the future. The 
contribution (donation) is imposed in order to get a future compensation. The amount of 
donation, in addition, is determined by the level of probability of risk. The rate of donation is 
adjusted in accordance to the participants‟ risk whereby the higher  the risk exposure, the higher 
is the contribution charged. This raises Shari’ah issue among the scholars as the concept of 
tabarru' is supposed to be accomplished voluntarily rather than on a compulsory basis. 
Furthermore, it is also argued that if the participant is entitled to make a claim as the 
compensation of contribution paid, it will change the overall structure of the takaful concept 
into a bilateral contract (mu'awadah) whereby money in the form of donation is exchanged with 
money in the form of claim. In this juncture, the issue of gharar and maysir, like the 
conventional counterpart, does take place due to uncertainty of the  subject matters exchanged.    
Some scholars upheld that the principle of making something that is voluntary into an 
obligation is substantially supported by the Maliki school of thought. Based on this  point of 
view, the contribution made by the participant is considered as an iltizam bi al-tabarru' (self-
commitment to donate) which is approved by Shari’ah. Under this principle, one who commits 
himself to do good things is obliged to do so. Some scholars, however, disagree with this 
concept as it comprises of two commitments - donation and indemnification which leads to 
bilateral contract. This condemnation is, however, being rebutted that although the concept has 
two commitments - donation and indemnification, the latter (indemnification) is not definite 
because it is tied upon the occurrence of catastrophe (Muhammad, 2010). Hence, it does not 
simply equivalent with the exchange or bilateral contract. 
On the other hand, the fact that the contribution made serves as a "price" for 
indemnification is viewed by some scholar that the tabarru' in takaful is reflected in the form of 
hibah bi thawab (a gift with expected compensation).  Sharh Al-Kharshi defines hibah bi 
thawab as a donation given for the purpose of attaining financial compensation in the future. 
Majority of the jurists, except for Imam Shafii, are of the view that the donation given with the 
expectation of getting compensation in exchanged is permissible (Raudhatul Thalibin, 5/384-
387).  
Box 1: AAOIFI, 2010 
 
AAOIFI Shari’ah standard No. 26 Article 3 
"Islamic insurance is based on the commitment of the participant to make donations for the 
sake of their own interest. The participants, therefore, protect their group by payment of 
contribution that constitute the resources of the insurance fund, and assign the management of 
that fund to a committee of policyholders or to a joint stock company that possesses the 
license of practicing insurance business. In the latter case, the company assumes this job on 
the basis of a remunerated wakala (agency) contract. In addition to managing the insurance 
operations, the committee policyholders or the company also assumes the responsibility of 
investing the assets of the fund through mudharabah or investment agency" 
AAOIFI, 2010. In No 26 article 4 (c) 
AAOIFI stated that the relationship between the policy holder and the fund takes the form of 
donation commitment at the stage of making contribution, and indemnification commitment 
at the stage of providing compensation for injury as per regulations and underlying 
constituent documents.  
 
Nevertheless, the application of hibah bi thawab, according to jurists, will change the 
nature of tabarru' from the unilateral contract to the bilateral contract. In other words, if the gift 
is made in exchange for claim received in the future, the ruling of gift equates to the ruling of 
sale (Muhammad, 2010). In this sense, the takaful contract constitutes an exchange contract in 
which the issue of gharar and maysir is then applied.  However some jurists, on the other hand, 
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are of view that hibah bi thawab is considered as unilateral contract such as pure gift with all its 
rulings and implications (Qurrah Daghi, 2004). Some other scholars, instead of use of iltizam bit 
tabarru' or hibah bi thawab, proposed the application of waqf model as the underlying tabarru' 
concept.   
In the current standard, the iltizam bi al-tabarru’ concept proposed by the Maliki school 
of thought seems to be the most internationally accepted concept. It is further evidenced in the 
boxes above.  
 
Issues on Underwriting Surplus 
 
The use of tabarru' concept in takaful creates another subsequent issue, namely the issue 
of underwriting surplus from tabarru' fund. The main issue in this perspective is whether the 
takaful operator is entitled to have a share in the underwriting surplus or whether the surplus is 
exclusively owned by the participants only, thus it should be redistributed back to them. To 
comprehend this further, the research will now provide the definition of underwriting surplus 
from two separate Islamic bodies, namely AAOIFI and Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB). It is further explained in Box 2 below. 
 
Box 2: AAOIFI, 2010 & IFSB, Takaful Governance Standard 
 
AAOIFI Accounting Standard No.13 
..."the excess of the total premium/contributions paid by policyholders during the financial 
period over the total indemnities paid in respect of claims incurred during the period, net of 
reinsurance and after deducting expenses and changes in technical provisions.” 
Takaful Governance Standard, IFSB 8 
...“the takaful fund‟s financial outturn from the risk elements of its business, being the 
balance after deducting expenses and claims (including any movement in provisions for 
outstanding claims) from the contributions income and adding the investment returns (income 
and gains on investment assets).” 
 
It is noteworthy to point that there are two main divergent views over the distribution of 
underwriting surplus. The first view treats the surplus as the participants‟ exclusive right hence 
should be entirely distributed to them. The second view believes in sharing the underwriting 
surplus between the participants and the takaful operators. The former is adopted and 
implemented by most GCC countries while the latter is practiced by Malaysian takaful 
companies (Ali, 2012). 
The first view is held by AAOIFI and IFSB standards as well as several international 
resolutions and fatwas. In Fatawa Ta'min, Dallah al-Barakah, 1986, it stated that the 
underwriting surplus is the exclusive right of the participants and thus it should be returned to 
them. The takaful operator has no entitlement to enjoy a portion of surplus. The AAIOFI 
Standard on takaful states: “the underwriting surplus and its returns, less expenses, and payment 
of claims, remain the property (milk) of the policyholders, which is the distributable surplus. 
This is not applied in commercial insurance, where the premiums become the property of the 
(insurance) company, by virtue of contract and acquisition, which would make its revenue and a 
profit for commercial insurance (AAOIFI Standard on Takaful, p.437).  
The AAOIFI position over the surplus distribution is premised upon the origin of surplus. 
It is clear that the surplus is produced from the contributions paid by the participants. The 
participants paid the contributions to enjoy a financial benefit in the event of hazard or peril. In 
addition, they also expect to enjoy a portion of an excess over claim. In addition, the AAOIFI's 
position over surplus is also grounded on the underlying contract that governs the contribution 
agreement. It is assumed that there is no explicit agreement to offer the surplus to the takaful 
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operator. Hence, implicitly, the surplus should go back to the one from whom the surplus is 
collected (Musa, 2010).   
However the opposing view is upheld by Shari’ah Advisory Council Bank Negara 
Malaysia. It is stated in the resolution (ref. no. 09/07/07) on the distribution of underwriting 
surplus that: "The Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (the Council) has made 
the resolution that the distribution of surplus from the tabarru' fund in takaful scheme is 
permissible from Shari’ah perspective. The council's resolution in allowing the distribution of 
surplus from the tabarru' fund (for both family and general takaful plans) to the 
participants/certificate holders and takaful operator is based on the premise that takaful contract 
is generally established on the Shari’ah principles of tabarru' (donation) and ta'awun (mutual 
cooperation), apart from the agreement among the contracting parties. In the formulation of 
takaful product, the principle of tabarru' has been the main underlying Shari’ah principle, 
although the application of other principles such as wakalah and mudharabah also complement 
the takaful operational structure. The council's resolution to allow such distribution is also based 
on the permissibility of performance fee for the takaful company". 
Thus, it is clear that the AAOIFI justification over distribution of surplus relies on the 
origin of surplus while the resolution of SAC BNM premises on the nature of tabarru' contract 
in which the participants have relinquished any claim over what they have already donated as 
tabarru„.    
 On the contrary, in the case of Indonesia, the treatment of underwriting surplus tends to 
adopt a more moderate approach. The fatwa issued by National Shari’ah Council - Indonesian 
Ulama Council on the distribution of surplus tries to accommodate both the GCC and Malaysian 
practices. It is further explained in Box 3 below. 
 
Box 3: Indonesian Ulama Council, 2006 
 
Indonesian Ulama Council Fatwa no. 53/DSN-MUI/III/2006 
The takaful operator may treat the underwriting surplus based on the three choices below:  
 
1. All underwriting surplus is placed into the reserve fund.  
2. The underwriting surplus is divided into two portions: One portion is for reserve and 
the other portion is for participants 
3. Certain percentage is allocated for reserve. The remaining is shared between 
participants and takaful operator. However, it is subject to the consent from the 
participants.   
 
The following issue arises in regard to the ownership of surplus from the Shari’ah 
perspective. AAOIFI undoubtedly ascertained that the surplus still belong to the participants as 
it is derived from the contribution paid by them. However, the participant has donated the 
premium as tabarru’, hence loses title over it, as prescribed by the rules of hibah in the 
Shari’ah. 
The juristic ruling over tabarru' is obvious that it requires relinquishing the ownership 
over the subject matter of tabarru'. The majority jurists upheld that hibah will cause the donor 
to lose the ownership of donated subject matter. The donation is transferred to the donee.  Ibn 
Qudamah pointed out that hibah requires donor to enable the beneficiary to own the object of 
hibah. Based on these premises, it is argued that the donor (participant) basically does not have 
any right or claim over the contribution unless it is stipulated in the agreement that the surplus 
from the contribution should be exclusively given to them. Otherwise, the distribution of the 
surplus will be decided based upon the agreement and condition agreed in the contract (Frenz & 
Soulhi, 2010). 
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To solve the ownership issue in the underwriting surplus, some scholars propose the 
application of "conditional contribution" to the takaful fund. Under this concept, a participant 
will contribute some amount of fund for mutual assistance on the condition if there is any 
surplus in the fund, it should be redistributed back to the participant. The concept allows the 
participant to retain ownership over the contribution (Frenz & Soulhi, 2010). Bouheraoua & 
Ahmad, 2011 proposed the concept of wadiah yad dhamanah (safekeeping with guarantee) to 
be applied in takaful operation. Under this contract, the takaful operator will act as custodian or 
depository institution whereby the participant will place their fund as deposit, coupled with a 
waiver clause to release some amount of the deposit for the purpose of indemnifying other 
participant. Under this concept, the funds still belong to the participants and the issue of surplus 
distribution is thus resolved.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The paper found that the main issue in the application of tabarru'  concept in takaful 
operation lies  in  the aspects that the applied tabarru’  departs from the original nature of 
tabarru' upon which the concept is legislated by Lawgiver. Many view that tabarru' is supposed 
to be accomplished voluntarily without expecting any compensation in return rather than on 
compulsory basis. It is argued that if the participant is entitled to make a claim as the 
compensation from contribution paid, it will change the whole structure of takaful concept into 
a bilateral contract (mu'awadhah) whereby money in the form of donation is exchanged with 
money in the form of claim. In this juncture, the issue of gharar and maysir, like the 
conventional counterpart, does take place. Another issue is the distribution of surplus resulting 
from the management of tabarru' fund. Some view that the surplus is the exclusive right of 
participants while other upheld that participants has donated the contribution as tabarru’, hence 
losing title over it.  
 In a nutshell, the progression of takaful industry has been a long journey. Many 
contentious Shariah issues need to be settled. Finding an ideal takaful concept is „the 
homework‟ of scholars, researchers, and industry players. Extensive research and deep study are 
essential in order to arrive at an ideal model as a basis for the operationalization of takaful, a 
model that serves as a bridge to the achievement of the noble objectives of the Shariah.  
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